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Abstract: 
Patent indicators are widely used to assess innovative output. Despite the 
large variety of empirical studies in the field, however, the precise meaning 
of these indicators and their obvious relation to patent value is still based on 
assumptions and intuitions. This paper provides the first empirical test of 
patent indicators as value measures in the structural form. It disentangles the 
different effects reflected in patent indicators and enhances our 
understanding why inventions are valuable at all. Using a newly assembled 
data set on European polymer patents, current assumptions on the 
innovation incentives set by patentability requirements (novelty, inventive 
activity) are tested. The estimations are carried out using a custom-tailored 
two stage discrete choice probit model yet unknown in the literature. The 
results support the assumptions that novelty and inventive activity enhance a 
patent’s value. They confirm the importance of backward citations, family 
size, and forward citations as va lue indicators. However, they expand on 
and partly break with the respective explanations why patent indicators 
correlate with profitability. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In 1965, Frederic Scherer drew economists’ attention to the importance of patent data 
as output measures of industrial innovation. In the following 25 years, an unprecedented 
stream of research evolved that used patent information as economic indicators. The main 
results of these two and a half decades of empirical patent economics – mainly studies on 
industrial productivity – are summarized in Griliches’ (1990) widely quoted survey article. 
Since then, however, activities in the field have not stalled. On the opposite, they have 
branched out in various directions and the use of patent information has entered into diverse 
economics and management disciplines. Inspired by the rising electronic availability of patent 
data and increasing processor speed and memory of personal computers during the last fifteen 
years, economists have spent extensive time on developing more sophisticated patent 
indicators than simple patent counts. Major efforts concentrated on the compilation and 
interpretation of procedural legal information published together with the disclosure of the 
technical invention underlying the patent. Nowadays, backward citations, forward citations, 
family size, and claims (to mention but a few) are standard indicators used to qualify patents 
and weight patent counts. The application of these indicators is no longer restricted to 
research questions associated with the original difficulty of measuring innovative output 
(Griliches, 1981; Conolly, Hirsch et al., 1986; Conolly and Hirschey, 1988; Megna and 
Klock, 1993; Cockburn and Griliches, 1988; Hall, Jaffe et al., 2000). Economists have also 
applied patent indicators to determine the likelihood of litigation (Lanjouw, 1998; Lanjouw 
and Schankerman, 2000; Harhoff and Reitzig, 2000), to study patterns of industrial 
organization (Bekkers, Duysters et al., 2002), and technology spillovers (Verspaargen and 
Loo, 1999). Management scholars use patent indicators to identify lucrative market segments 
(Ernst, 1996), for competition analysis (Ernst, 1998), and most recently even to study 
knowledge flows within corporations (Trajtenberg, Henderson et al., 1997; Rosenkopf and 
Nerkar, 2001; Argyres and Silverman, 2002). Looking at this rapid development it seems as if 
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the applicability of patent information to the measurement of economic phenomena was 
straight forward. 
This impression, however, may prove to be deceptive at second sight. The reason is 
that the information contents of patent indicators is complex and the diversity of its potential 
meanings is far from being understood in all detail. The main caveat is that the information 
contained within patents (and respective indicators) is legal of nature and therefore first of all 
operationalizes (latent) legal variables. Only through an additional body of theory can these 
indicators ultimately be linked to economic phenomena. During the last 30 years, patent 
economists have drawn a complex picture of assumptions which latent variables drive a 
patent’s economic value both from a welfare and an individual perspective and which trade-
offs they are subject to (Scotchmer and Green, 1990, 1995; Scotchmer, 1996; Gallini, 1992), 
Klemperer, 1990; Gilbert and Shapiro, 1990). Our theoretical understanding of the 
correlations between a patent’s observable legal characteristics and their economic effects, 
however, is still very limited in part. By saying so I am not only referring to the most recent 
applications of patent indicators to knowledge management where little or no hard theory-
based empirical evidence exists that patent measures operationalize the latent constructs they 
are supposed to operationalize. Even in the ‘classical’ field of indicator based assessments of 
intellectual property rights we still often rely on various plausible assumptions and widely 
accepted connotations when interpreting estimation results. Undisputedly it is true that a large 
variety of respective studies in this field (see Appendix A) has convincingly demonstrated the 
general suitability of procedural patent data to operationalize a patent’s economic value.  To 
the best of my knowledge, however, no empirical study exists that allows to interpret 
coefficients of patent indicators as patent value correlates in the structural form (with the 
exception of the pioneering work on simple patent counts by Pakes, 1986). From a scientific 
and an applied perspective, however, this is dissatisfying for one major reason. The reason is 
that for a variety of theoretical and practical problems we are not only interested if an 
 3
invention is of commercial value but why it is of commercial value. Industrial economists, for 
example, often would like to know if sector performances can be attributed to the quality of 
the underlying technology or to sth. else. Policy makers need to understand how the 
adjustment of patentability requirements affects innovation incentives all other variables 
being equal. Finally, management scholars are interested in the potential of markets 
independent of the technical value of individual patent rights. 
This paper addresses the problem of validating indicators of patent value in the 
structural form for the first time in the literature. By doing so, it seeks to disentangle the 
multitude of effects reflected in patent indicators and explain if and why they operationalize 
the economic value of patent rights. At the same time, it serves as an empirical test of our 
current theoretical understanding how patentability requirements affect innovation incentives. 
As a further side-effect it presents a novel discrete choice estimator suitable for testing 
decision problems in which the anticipated outcome in the second stage affects the decision in 
the first stage. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section two provides the 
theoretical framework and section three presents the hypotheses, the research design, and the 
underlying econometrics. Part four presents the data and empirical estimation results that are 
discussed in part five. Section six concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
 
During the last two decades, at least two different research directions related to the 
valuation of patents have developed in parallel. Even though they have occasionally been 
linked, no systematic approach has yet been chosen to bring the two together until most 
recently (Reitzig, 2002a). These two research streams are described in the (mainly) theoretical 
literature on the optimal design of patent systems and the (dominantly) empirical literature on 
patent indicators. 
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Latent variables of patent value  
 
The theoretical literature has assumed that the following (latent) variables should  
affect a patent’s value for his/her owner: Patent duration, novelty and inventive activity (non-
obviousness), breadth, disclosure, difficulty in inventing around, and dependence on 
complementary assets.3 Since at least the first three of them fall into the category of legal 
patentability requirements, most of the respective literature in the field stems from economists 
interested in the design of innovation systems. Already Nordhaus (1967) started from the  
premise that the economic value of a patent for its holder increases with the patent’s duration. 
Younger models (see for example Matutes, Regibau et al., 1996) differ from their 
predecessors mainly in that they make more realistic assumptions as to the distribution of 
returns-per-period over time.4 Green and Scotchmer (1995) introduced the impact of ‘novelty’ 
and ‘non-obviousness’ (inventive activity) on patent value to the discussion. They assumed 
both variables to increase the value of the patent right. Klemperer (1990) and Gilbert and 
Shapiro (1990) were the first to propose that the degree to which a patent protects an 
invention, namely the patent’s breadth, affects the patent’s value positively. It was again 
Green and Scotchmer (1995) who modeled disclosure as a value driver of patents assuming 
that disclosing technical information conferred a positive externality on the patent-holder’s 
competitors. Consequently they assumed that disclosure should diminish the economic value 
of a patent for his/her owner.  Also, as patents may be used for blocking competitors in certain 
industries, their values should rise the more difficult it becomes to circumnavigate the 
protected invention with a new technology. Gallini (1992) introduced this idea into a formal 
model for the first time. Finally, it was Teece (1986) who reminded us that oftentimes, 
                                                                 
3  See Reitzig (2003) for an overview. 
4  Consistent with the literature on technology cycles (see for example Kotler and Bliemel, 1995) the  
younger models do not assume that returns-per-period are constant but that returns-per-period are 
subject to the life stage of the underlying technology. 
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complementary technology and other complementary assets are needed to commercialize the 
patent protected invention.  
More recently, these latent variables have been referred to in the management 
literature as ‘value drivers’ of the underlying technology in real-option frameworks (Reitzig, 
2002b/2002c) that are currently extended to patent valuations (Pitkethly, 1999). Within these 
frameworks, the influence of technical (Gilbert and Newberry, 1982), market (Gilbert and 
Newberry, 1982), and legal (Lanjouw, 1998, Harhoff and Reitzig, 2000) uncertainty on a 
patent’s present value is discussed as the patent’s volatility. Whereas the first two types of 
uncertainty should theoretically enhance a patent’s value for his/her owner, the latter one can 
only reduce it. 
Little direct empirical evidence from primary data exists on the validity of the above 
assumptions. The only existing questionnaire-based study in the field stems from the 
semiconductor industry (Reitzig, 2003). Its findings are consistent with the theoretical 
assumptions apart from the effect of the disclosure. 
 
Indicators of patent value  
 
Comprehensive empirical studies using secondary data have been carried out trying to 
validate procedural legal information referring to the granting procedure or to litigation details 
as value indicators. Appendix A provides a synopsis of the most important large-scale 
empirical studies ordered by indicators. 
The meaning of these indicators as well as their theoretical and empirical degree of 
validity has been extensively discussed in the literature (see Reitzig, 2002b/2002c for a 
comprehensive overview). Readers are kindly addressed to the relevant sources for the 
detailed discussion of the current knowledge on value indicators. For the purpose of this 
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paper, only the most important findings relevant for the derivation of the hypotheses are 
summarised briefly.  
Backward citations – these are quotations of prior art relevant to the patentability of an 
invention during the granting procedure – are supposed to be positively correlated with value. 
In the case of quotations to prior patent literature the common rationale is that the citations 
operationalize existing market potentia l. In the case of quotations to the non-patent literature 
– especially scientific publications – economists often argue that the link of the patent’s 
invention to basic research indicates high technological quality and therefore economic value 
(Carpenter, Cooper et al., 1980). Backward citations to both patent and non-patent literature 
belong to the fairly well validated indicators. 
Forward citations, that is the number of quotations a patent receives itself during 
subsequent granting procedures of younger patents, turn out to be positively correlated with a 
patent’s value in all known studies. Various rationales are put forth. One is that forward 
citations are supposed to operationalize market potential of a the patent independent of the 
technological sophistication or quality of the underlying invention. This rationale holds 
especially – but not exclusively – true for citations made by an applicant. At the same time, 
however, forward citations are also suspected to operationalize the legal value drivers novelty 
and inventive activity. This appears particularly plausible if the quotations were inserted by 
the patent examiner. 
‘Family size’ is an indicator that measures the size of the territory in which the patent 
holder enjoys exclusivity. Most times it is argued that it is a measure of the market size of the 
invention which is not necessarily correlated with technical sophistication. The family size 
indicator is also fairly well validated. 
A series of other indicators has been tested as value indicators in earlier studies, too. 
Among those are the ‘Scope’ variable, the ownership variable, the litigation indicators, 
indicators referring to the filing strategy, the number of applicants, the number of cross-
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boarder research co-operations, the accelerated examination request, and the claims. The 
empirical evidence of their validity as of today varies, however, they still all belong to the 
extended set of weighting measures for patent counts applied in the field today. More 
interesting for the purpose of this paper are the differences in their theoretical foundation. 
Whereas claims and scope are supposed to operationalize a patent’s breadth, the number of 
applicants and the number of cross-boarder research co-operations should reflect a high 
degree of technological sophistication; i.e. the technology should be novel and highly 
inventive. The filing strategy variables and the accelerated examination request are deemed to 
be mainly signs of market size for the invention. Finally, the meaning of the litigation 
indicator depends on its compilation. Counting unsuccessful oppositions or challenge suits ex-
post yields a pure value indicator. Counting legal attacks ex-ante before the outcome of the 
opposition procedure or the trial is over has a more complicated meaning that is not discussed 
here but in the section on the research design. 
 
3. Open research questions, hypotheses, and research design 
 
In the introduction I identified one major research goal in the field, namely to understand 
why inventions are of commercial value with the help of indicators. One important application 
of this general goal was an empirical test of the assumption that patentability requirements 
such as novelty and inventive activity affect the economic value of a patent right. Based on 
the current understanding, the following hypotheses should therefore be tested. 
 
Hypotheses 
 
H1: Novelty and inventive activity (non-obviousness) affect the economic value of a 
patent protected invention positively. 
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H2: Indicators such as backward citations to the non-patent literature, forward 
citations, the number of inventors, and the number of applicants (from now on referred 
to as indicator set å bx ) operationalize novelty and inventive activity. 
H3: Indicators such as backward citations to the patent literature, forward citations, 
family size, indicators referring to the filing strategy, and the accelerated examination 
request (from now on referred to as indicator set å gz ) are positively correlated with 
a patent’s value. However, they do not operationalize novelty and inventive activity. 
The following section describes the research design chosen for the test of H1 through H3. 
 
The research design 
In principle, two generically different approaches can be chosen to test H1 through H3. 
One potential research design relates indicators to custom tailored primary data, namely 
expert assessments on the latent variables of patent value. This paper pursues the other 
approach using secondary data. Based on a simplified theoretical decision making problem it 
analyzes observable oppositions in the European patent system in the light of their expected 
outcomes by the parties.   
 
The theoretical decision making problem 
In the European patent system, third parties can attack a patent within nine months 
after its grant by filing a so-called opposition. The opposition procedure differs slightly from 
the challenge suit procedure in the US (see Reitzig 2002c for the details). For the purpose of 
this paper, these differences can be neglected though. There are three potential outcomes of an 
opposition procedure. Either the patent is upheld and remains unchanged (1), or the patent is 
amended (2), or it is revoked (3).5 According to Art. 100 of the European Patent Convention 
                                                                 
5  Graham, Hall et al. (2002) note that there is a ’forth’ outcome category, i.e. the opposition procedure is  
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(EPC) the ruling on the outcome is given by the European patent office based on a 
(re)assessment of the patentability requirements, the main ones being: novelty, inventive 
activity, commercial applicability. Finally, insufficient disclosure of the invention can lead to 
a revocation or an amendment of the patent, too. Since an opposition procedure is costly and 
since the alternative option to an opposition is a settlement agreement, one can assume that 
 
A1: The incentives to file an opposition are determined by the value at stake and 
the parties’ subjectively perceived likelihoods of the patent being upheld, 
amended, or revoked. 
 
In the economic literature on litigation an analogous assumption has been used 
extensively (Priest, 1984; Waldvogel, 1998) and appears to be commonly accepted. Lanjouw 
and Lerner (1997) also showed the suitability of this premise in the case of patent litigations. 
For the specific case of an opposition Harhoff and Reitzig (2000) emphasize the particular 
importance of settlement costs, but in principle they also agree on the above assumption. 
Thus, the opponent’s rationale to file an opposition can be illustrated by the decision 
tree in Figure 1. 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
“closed”. The way they define this category it “refers to cases in which the patent holders do not renew 
patent protection after the opposition has been filed, which causes the patent to lapse into the public 
domain”. In default of better information they suggest to consider these cases as successful challenges 
of the patent’s validity. Whilst there may be explanations to do so this paper takes a different approach 
based on intense discussions with senior representatives at the Board of Appeals at the European Patent 
Office. The expert argues that the ‘closure’ of an opposition as reported in the data source 
www.epoline.org is a decision by the opponent and most likely a ‘retreat’ from the legal attack. 
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Legend: 
pno: Profits of the ‘opponent’ in the case of no opposition. 
prj: Profits of the opponent if the opposition is rejected. 
pam: Profits of the opponent if the patent is amended. 
prv : Profits of the opponent if the patent is revoked. 
 
The (potential) opponent will attack the patent holder if his/her profits in the case of an 
opposition exceed his/her profits in the case of passive behavior. His/her decision making 
problem and the resulting likelihood of an observable opposition can thus be expressed in 
formal terms. 
elsep
and
opprevocpoppamendpopprejecp
ifoppp
noopponentrvopponentamopponentrj
0
.)|.(.)|.(.)|.(
1.)(
=
>×+×+×
=
pppp
 (1) 
 
The estimation problem and its relation to the hypotheses tests 
 
To turn the system of equations (1) into an estimation problem that allows for a test of 
H1 through H3, some further assumptions and simplifications are necessary. The assumptions 
are mostly unproblematic. Thus, they are only briefly described and vindicated in the 
following. 
 
A2: The opponent’s profits can theoretically be driven by both patentability 
requirements (novelty, inventive activity) and other factors. 
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This assumption is straight forward. Any alternative assumption would falsify H1, H2, 
and H3 per definitionem. 
 
A3: The opponent can reasonably anticipate the decision of the opposition 
procedure by the EPO. The EPO bases its ruling on the opposition solely on two 
criteria, namely the fulfillment of novelty and inventive activity. 
 
This assumption is necessary to infer from observable outcomes of opposition decisions 
(see below) on the opponent’s estimation of novelty and inventive activity. The first part 
of the assumption is entirely unproblematic because it reflects the dogmatic guideline of 
the EPO. But also the second part is very plausible given the large litigation experience 
of most opponents (see also Harhoff and Reitzig, 2001). In a formalized fashion, this 
assumption states that  
),(.)|( stepinventivenoveltyfoppoutcomepopponent =  (2) 
Finally, the last two assumptions are the following. 
A4: The opponent’s profits given the different possible rulings of the EPO are 
determined as follows:  
),,,(;;0 cfactorsotheractivityinventivenoveltyfc rvamrjno -=-=== pppp  
and 
A5: The opponent’s decision is not determined by his/her possibility to appeal against 
the EPO ruling on the opposition procedure. 
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Assumption four is the most simplifying of all. It states that the opponent almost completely 
internalizes the value of the patent for his/her holder which might not be entirely true for all 
competitive scenarios.6 It also contains a simplification in that is sets the profits for two 
outcome scenarios equal, namely the amendment of the patent and the rejection of the 
opposition. From talks with patent attorneys, however, it seems as if this simplification also 
reflected reality sufficiently well in certain industries (see also section four). Finally, 
assumption five potentially simplifies the opponent’s rationale in that it does not consider 
subsequent appeal or litigation possibilities any more.7 
Implementing A1, A2 and A4 into equation(s) (1) then yields the following condition 
for an opposition: 
( ) ( )
elseoppp
and
pifoppp
opprejectionpoppamendmentppWith
rvrjamrvrjam
0.)(
)()(1.)(
.|.|
,,
=
->-=
+=
pppp
   (3) 
 
To test H1 through H3, a maximum likelihood estimator based on equation system (3) is 
now needed. Using a respective ML-estimator and operationalizing novelty and inventive 
activity by indicator set å bx  (and error terme ) and other factors by indicator set å gz  
(and error termh ) could disentangle the multitude of effects measured by indicators. It could 
finally help to explain why patent indicators measure patent value. Despite the great variety of 
various two stage discrete choice models described in the econometric literature, however, no 
                                                                 
6  In a sector in which patents are mainly used as bargaining chips, this assumption could lead to a  
distraction from the ‘real’ results. For the industry analyzed in this paper the assumption should hold 
well though (see also the following section four). 
7  The simplification, however, seems inevitable. Neither does a three stage model accounting for appeal  
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standard estimator suitable for this decision problem exists. For this reason, a custom-tailored 
estimator was developed for the present problem.8 The likelihood function is given below, its 
derivation is described in Appendix B. 
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The estimator described in equation (4) maximizes the likelihood of an opposition 
including the opponent’s anticipated probability of winning or losing his case.9 The value of 
the patent is modeled by novelty, inventive activity, and other value determining parameters; 
the opponent’s anticipation of the patent being upheld (revoked) is modeled by novelty and 
inventive activity (consistent with assumption 3). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
or other litigation possibilities appear feasible, nor does a further truncation of the data (see section 
four) appear reasonable. 
8  Full identification of the estimator was positively tested using simulated data. 
9  This feature distinguishes the estimator from known discrete choice models that are available in  
statistical software packets, such as multinomial/nested logits or Heckman’s probit (see e.g. Heckman, 
1979). Neither do econometric text books (see e.g. Maddala, 1983) report on an estimator of the above 
kind. 
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Finally, the data prerequisites of the chosen research design and the consequences for 
the sample selection are briefly elucidated in the last part of this section. 
 
Data prerequisites 
 
The model underlying the estimator starts from the premise that the value of a patent 
revocation for the opponent is proportional to the value of the patent for its holder. This 
assumption is fulfilled best in markets where patent holders enjoy temporary monopoly 
profits and would have to share duopoly profits if they did not have legal protection. 
Therefore it seems inevitable to run the empirical test on patent data from a discrete product 
industry. 
Besides, a main distinguishing feature from earlier empirical studies on patent litigation or 
opposition is the explicit modeling of the key assumption that anticipated success and failure 
rates enter the opponent’s or plaintiff’s rationale.10 In the present paper, observable outcomes 
of opposition procedures are used to model the opponent’s anticipation. Thus, the data need to 
comprehend the sets of value indicators as described in H2 and H3, the observable opposition, 
and the corresponding EPO ruling. This means, however, that the data for the analysis are in 
principal truncated and non-trivial sample selection problems arise that are described in the 
next section. 
 
4. Empirical results 
 
                                                                 
10  To the best of my knowledge the study by Graham, Hall et al. (2002) is the only one that presents  
litigation and opposition outcome data at all. That study, however, contains no structural validation of 
value indicators modeling subjective outcome anticipations in any way. 
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Sample selection 
 
The sample chosen for the analysis contains European polymer patents for two 
reasons.11 First, it seems as if in polymers individual patents could protect most of the 
technology inherent in the final product (see e.g. Cohen, Nelson, et al., 2000).  Thus it is 
plausible to assume that the value of a patent revocation to the opponent is highly correlated 
with the value of the valid patent for its owner. Secondly, to the best of my knowledge there is 
no large-scale empirical study on European polymer patents. Below its primary goal, by 
presenting the data this paper therefore also extends our knowledge base of this industry in a 
more general fashion. 
The selection of the industrial field was based on an updated version of the OST INPI 
ISI classification by Schmoch (1998, personal note). Polymer patents were identified as 
belonging to the following IPC subclasses: C08B, F, G, H, K, L; C09D, J. As of September 
2002 (date of the data extraction) the European patent register contained 27,635 patents in 
these areas. At this point, 2,762 (9.99%) patents of the patent in the sample had been opposed. 
For 2,150 of these opposed patents, a decision by the first instance at the EPO – the 
opposition chamber – was observable in September 2002. For the remaining part of the 
patents I could not identify any clear ruling by the opposition chamber at that date. Figure 2 
shows the share of undecided oppositions among the total sample versus the year of patent 
grants. 
 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
 
Figure two shows a steep ascent of undecided oppositions after the year 1990. Pending 
better explanation I take it that this increase can be attributed to the share of opposition cases 
still to be decided in September 2002 by the first instance at the EPO, namely the opposition 
 16 
chamber.12 As this paper (see Assumption 5) does focus on the decision of the opposition 
chamber only (no further appeals, no subsequent litigation), I cut off the tail of patents granted 
from 1991 onwards and did not further inquire on the history of the residual percentage of 
approx. 10% of undecided opposition cases between 1978 and 1990. It is most likely that 
these latter patents have lapsed or are still under opposition. 13 Thus, the final data for the 
analysis comprises 16.711 EP patents granted between 1978 and 1990.  
 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the sample. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
The most interesting findings are briefly discussed. With 11.5% the rate of opposition in the 
polymer chemistry industry is significantly increased over the total population of EP patents 
granted in this period. It almost takes on the same value as in the litigious pharmaceutical and 
biotechnological industry (10.79% and 10.24% opposition between 1978 and 1990). This 
preliminarily confirms the assumption that patents in polymers are used as ‘exclusion rights’. 
In about 38% of all oppositions, third parties attack holders successfully according to the 
notion of this paper; i.e. the patent is revoked by the opposition chamber. In about 21% of the 
cases the patent is amended, in another 26% of the observations the opposition is rejected 
because it is not considered to be substantiated. Both cases are considered to be defeats for the 
opponent in the current paper.14 In the remaining roughly 15% of the oppositions the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
11  The patents were identified via the OST INPI ISI classification based on IPCs. 
12  Data on the average duration of opposition procedures have been published in the literature for the  
fields of pharmaceuticals and biotechnology only. As Graham, Hall et al. (2002) describe, opposition 
procedures may take about 2.7 (2.8) years (after/pre 1991 applications). Adding the average granting 
time of 4.3 years for patents in the same area (Reitzig, 2002b) to that value yields an average period of 7 
years from grant to opposition ruling in these industries. Looking further at the variance of this period it 
is therefore entirely plausible to observe an increase in undecided opposition procedures of 10 to 11 
year old patents as is the case here. 
13  See “Descriptive Statistics” for a discussion of the resulting effects for this analysis. 
14  The reason is that in a discrete product industry such as polymer chemistry amendments can  
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procedure was either closed (4.9%) or no outcome can yet be identified (10.3% pending). The 
latter two cases are also regarded as defeats for the opponent.15  
The explaining variables are not conspicuous in that their order of magnitude corresponds to 
various earlier studies in related industries, in particular to the study by Reitzig (2002a). On 
average, three references to patents of prior art were made by the EPO examiners during the 
European search procedure. On average, every second patent cites a non-patent literature 
reference as relevant state of the art. The patents were applied for in 7.47 states on average, 
and almost three inventors (2.7) were involved in each application. The relatively high 
number of designation states and the high inventor-to-applicant ratio supports the assumption 
that most of the patents in this industry are held by corporations and not by individual 
inventors. This observation is in concordance with the high opposition rate given that 
oppositions are costly. The mean for accelerated examination requests lies fairly low. Not 
even one percent of all patents are applied for following the PACE program. This observation 
supports the view that lead-time advantages in this industry may be less important than in 
other industries. It also supports the assumption, however, that the applicants are experienced 
in interacting with the EPO and can anticipate the office’s reactions well (see Assumption 
3).16 Interestingly then, however, the percentage of PCTII filings is high compared to Reitzig 
(2002a) and the ratio of PCTII to PCTI is stunning. The latter findings indicate that applicants 
are delaying cost intense decisions in more than 7% of the applications by choosing the PCTII 
route. While this may be a sign of uncertainty (and therefore be at odds with the low 
acceleration request rate) an explanation for the observation lies in the applicant structure of 
this sample. Given that the applicant-to- inventor ratio hints at a dominating corporate 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
theoretically be backed-up fairly well by the integration of so-called fall back options. Those are 
inserted in the form of dependent claims in the patent draft (Reitzig, 2002b). Thus, it is likely that 
amendments are less harmful for the patent owner than in other industries. 
15  It is unlikely that this will lead to an important selection bias since there is neither an indication that  
these patents – if lapsed – were lapsed because of the opposition procedure, nor that – if not lapsed – 
patents involved in extremely time -taking opposition procedures are revoked significantly more often 
than other patents. 
16  Acceleration of examination if oftentimes requested if the decision of the EPO can not be anticipated at  
 18 
applicant structure it may well be that the applicants are simply cost insensitive. Finally, the 
average number of forward citations (three years time window after publication) in 
subsequent EPO search procedures is 0.55. This figure is fairly low compared to Lanjouw and 
Schankerman (2000) or Harhoff and Reitzig (2000) indicating that the average scientific 
impact of a polymer patent on subsequent applications may be lower than in pharmaceuticals 
or biotechnology. But after all, these considerations remain speculative until a certain point. 
Thus, in the following the structural estimation seeks to contribute to a somewhat better 
understanding what the indicators really measure. Before that, however, estimations in the 
reduced form are presented. 
 
Estimations in the reduced form 
 
Table 2 shows the results of two simple probit estimations. In column A the likelihood 
of an opposition is modeled by the set of indicators based on the entire sample. In column B 
the conditional probability of the patent being upheld after opposition is modeled by the same 
set of indicators. However, regression B is carried out on the sample of opposed patents only. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
Overall, the model of the likelihood of an opposition presented in column A is highly 
significant. Individually significant coefficients in column A are found for the backward 
citations to the patent literature and to the non-patent literature, the family size, forward 
citations, and the PCTI indicator. The remaining variables are individually and jointly 
insignificant (c2(4)-test: 2.45; P>0.65 ). Looking at column B, only the number of inventors is 
significantly and negatively correlated with the maintenance of the patent in an opposition 
procedure. The remaining variables are individually and jointly insignificant (c2(8)-test: 6.78; 
P>0.56). Correlations among the independent variables are moderate overall (-0.37 until 0.12) 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
a point where investments have to be made (see Reitzig, 2002b).  
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and are therefore not reported separately here. On the basis of the simple estimation results in 
column A it is impossible to test H1, H2, and H3. The reason is that it is impossible to 
distinguish between the different effects that the individually significant variables exert on the 
likelihood of an opposition. Whilst it may be – as has been excessively discussed in the 
literature – that the backward citations to the patent literature hint at the existing market and 
that the negative coefficient for the non-patent literature references hints at ‘low’ technical 
quality of the patent, various other explanations may also hold true. By no means is it possible 
to make a clear statement as to whether novelty and inventive activity enter the value of the 
patent positively or not. Looking at the regression results of column B it would also be 
difficult to reject or sustain hypothesis H2. First of all, the model is overall insignificant. 
Surpris ingly, only the number of inventors is significantly correlated with the maintenance of 
the patent but exerts a negative effect on the likelihood of the patent surviving opposition. The 
latter finding is certainly counterintuitive. Aside from this, however, the estimations carried 
out in column B do not really appear suited for a test of H2. The reason is basically the same 
as mentioned above for the results of column A. The indicators may potentially operationalize 
various effects, including effects that are unrelated to the degree of novelty and inventive 
activity. Thus, to test H1, H2, and H3 only the estimations in the structural form can shed 
further light on the research questions.  
 
Estimations in the structural form 
 
Table 3 shows the results of the new simultaneous equation estimator that reflects the 
decision making rationale of the opponent in stage one (opposition) depending on his 
anticipated outcome in stage two (EPO ruling on the opposition outcome) 
Insert Table 3 about here 
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According to the above notation XB denotes the set of indicators that are supposed to 
operationalize novelty and inventive activity. To test H1 and H2, however, I use the full set of 
potential indicators and compare the individually significant variables to the set of indicators 
as specified in H2 afterwards. Correspondingly, ZG denotes the set of indicators that are 
supposed to be value correlates of the patent without operationalizing novelty and inventive 
activity. Again, I start from the full set of available explanatory variables when testing H3. 
The results are not counterintuitive though surprising at various points. First of all it is 
important to note that the model is overall significant. From a purely statistical standpoint it 
models the likelihood of an opposition worse than the simple probit in column 2 B though. As 
was argued above, however, this simple measure does not reflect the economic suitability of 
the results. Interestingly, all the individually significant variables in XB, namely the backward 
citations to the patent literature, the family size, and the forward citations contribute positively 
to the likelihood of an opposition and to the likelihood of a patent being upheld. The 
remaining variables in XB are individually and jointly insignificant (c2(6)-test: 6.91; P>0.33). 
If and why this result can be regarded as preliminary empirical evidence for H1 will discussed 
in more detail in the following. 
Coming to individual levels of significance among the variables specified in XB the finding 
for the forward citations is consistent with the expectation. The number of inventors is almost 
significant (P=0.12). On the other hand, however, I find no empirical evidence that the 
number of backward citations to the non-patent literature operationalizes novelty or inventive 
activity. Interestingly, however, the references to the patent literature are significant 
regressors in the XB set of indicators. To what extent this sustains H2 or not will be discussed 
in the next part. 
Finally, the results for the coefficients in ZG are also interesting. The only significant 
coefficient here is the one of the backward citations to the non-patent literature. The 
remaining variables in ZG are individually and jointly insignificant (c2(6)-test: 5.53; P>0.70). 
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Again, the question as to what this means for the validity of H3 will be discussed in the 
following. 
 
 
5. Discussion 
 
 
The results from the multivariate estimations require further interpretation before 
conclusions can be drawn with respect to the validity of the hypotheses H1 through H3. At 
first it seems feasible to concentrate on the potential meanings of the regression results in the 
structural form. 
In principle, the sheer fact that all the individually significant variables in XB 
contribute positively to the likelihood of an opposition can be regarded as strong evidence to 
support hypothesis H1. The reason is that the estimator uses the indicators in XB 
simultaneously for both estimating the likelihood of an opposition and the likelihood of patent 
maintenance. Thus, variables with significant and positive coefficients in XB operationalize 
novelty and inventive activity and contribute positively to the patent’s value.17 The finding 
appears to be of consierable relevance with respect to the large amount of theoretical literature 
in the field designing patent systems on the assumption that H1 holds true. 
Following the same line of thought I therefore also find strong empirical evidence that 
forward citations made by the examiner operationalize novelty and inventive activity as was 
hypothesized in H2. Almost significant (P=12.7) is also the coefficient for the number of 
inventors as was again hypothesized in H2. Interestingly, however, none of these indicators 
could have been validated as correlates of novelty and inventive activity in the simple 
estimations in the reduced form due to the selection bias there (Table 2, column B). 
Unexpectedly, both the family size and the number of citations to the patent literature are 
                                                                 
17  Note that theoretically the result can still be an artifact if the indicators operationalized further  
 22 
significant in XB. The result is consistent with the reduced form estimations in Table 2 
(column A), however, at odds with hypotheses H2 and H3. The latter two variables were 
suspected to contribute to a patent’s value without necessarily operationalizing technical 
quality. Apparently, this is not the case for the polymer patents in this sample. The 
estimations in the structural form clearly indicate that the two variables contribute to a 
patent’s value and operationalize technical quality at the same time. Obviously, a causal link 
between these two observations must not be established on the basis of this research design, 
however, would be very intuitive. Finally, the estimation result for the references to the non-
patent literature is striking for three reasons: their coefficient is not significant among the set 
of XB regressors (a), it is significant among the set of ZG regressors (b), and it is negative (c). 
Due to the structural form of the estimation it is unambiguous that at least for this sample 
patent references to the non-patent literature affect a patent’s value independently of their 
suitability to operationalize technical quality. This ‘non-technical’ effect has a negative 
impact on the patent’s value which is not counterintuitive given the industry analyzed. Cycle 
times in polymer chemistry are supposed to be shorter than in pharmaceuticals and 
biotechnology. Thus, the scientific linkage as partly expressed by non-patent quotations 
should be less of a value indicator. Besides, the corporate applicant structure in the industry 
(see above) also supports the view that patenting in this industry is more important than 
publishing. Thus, in this particular industry references to non-patent literature should be less 
important and maybe even hint at a technological dead end street that has not been exploited 
before (negative coefficient). 
Coming to the end of this discussion it seems qualified to ask as to what extent the 
regression results from that novel estimator are robust. First of all the overall significance 
(P<0.01) is high allowing to draw conclusion from the estimation results at all. More 
importantly, however, the correlation coefficient between the first and the second stage is 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
contingency variables not inherent in the model. There is no reason to believe that this is the case 
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significantly different from 1.18 This and the fact that the individual results found are highly 
plausible makes me believe that the estimator has passed the test of suitability for this type of 
estimation problem. 
  
6. Summary and future research 
This paper started from the premise that various intuitions and assumptions exist as to  
what determines the value of a patent and how the value of a patent can be assessed using 
indicators. Despite the existing large-scale empirical evidence in the field it argued that tests 
of these assumptions still deserve further attention by empirical economists. It lay out that an 
answer to the question why inventions generate profits at all is crucial for various reasons, 
namely to understand how patentability requirements related to novelty and inventive activity 
affect innovation incentives and how non-technical factors drive profitability. Ultimately, the 
question as to how these different latent value drivers can be assessed through indicators is of 
importance to empirical industrial economists. To enhance our understanding, this paper 
presented an empirical study based on 16.711 EP polymer patents granted between 1978 and 
1990. Applying a novel two stage discrete choice simultaneous equation estimator to the data 
I could – within my framework of assumptions – support the hypothesis that novelty and 
inventive activity contribute positively to a patent’s value from an individual perspective. 
Contrasting the structural estimation results to regressions carried out in the reduced form I 
could sustain the common notion that forward citations are a measure of the patent’s technical 
quality. However, I also found that both family size and patent backward citations are value 
correlates and (because they?) are correlated to the technical quality of the invention. 
Interestingly, in the field of polymer chemistry backward citations exert a negative effect on 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
though. 
18  Local maxima can be found at 1, =exr  and 1, -=exr , however, their interpretation becomes  
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the patent’s va lue which is not related to the patent’s novelty or inventive activity. The results 
are relevant in that they sustain the theoretical literature on the design of patent systems that 
patentability requirements such as novelty and inventive activity can be important setscrews 
for innovation incentives in certain industries. In the sample of polymer patents technical 
sophistication seems to be the crucial element for patent value – a result that was not 
necessarily to be expected and may well be falsified in other industries. The results also 
enhance empirical economists’ understanding as to what they really measure when using 
patent indicators. Finally, the paper contributed a new estimator to the field of empirical 
economics that shows a special feature in that it simultaneously estimates a discrete choice 
problem in the first stage conditional on the outcome of the decision in the second stage. This 
type of estimator may be useful for various analogous applications as well. 
At this point I see various directions into which to proceed with this research. I only 
want to mention the two most important ones in my eyes. First of all the estimator can be 
applied to various other industries so that inter industry comparisons become possible. It is 
very likely that these comparisons will supply us with interesting novel insights as to how 
innovation is driven in different industries. It might well be that the existing decision making 
model which is based on the assumption that patents are used as exclusion rights will fail in 
other technical fields such as semiconductors and needs adjustment. Secondly, relaxations of 
the assumptions by refining the model structure would be worthwhile. For example, the 
aggregation of different outcomes in opposition procedures to two generic categories, namely 
success or defeat, can be defined and might enhance the estimation quality. To do so, suitable 
proxies for the breadth of a patent would have to be derived, too. 
   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
redundant in that it basically confirms the estimation results from the reduced form estimations only. At  
1, =exr  and 1, -=exr one of the two set of indicators, XB or ZG, dominates the other and the various 
effects at work can not be disentangled any more. 
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 VI 
Appendix A 
Validation Studies of Patent Value Indicators in the Reduced Form 
 
Methodology Indicator Study (Authors) 
- Number of 
Observations / 
Industrial Sector 
- Dependent Variable  
(if Multivariate 
Test) 
- Type of 
Validity 
Results (Significance/Sign) 
Carpenter, Cooper et al. (1980) - N=399 US patents on 
prostaglandines 
- None - Face 
validity 
-  
Narin, Noma et al. (1987) - N=17 Pharmaceutical 
companies 
- Indicators of 
corporate 
technological strength 
- Construct 
validity 
- Patent citations to the scientific literature significant 
- Positive correlation 
Lanjouw and Schankerman (2000) - N=10.378 US patents - Infringement and 
challenge suits 
- Construct 
validity 
- Significant 
- Negative correlation 
Lanjouw and Schankerman (1999)§ - N= approx. 8000 US 
patents 
- Latent variable of 
patent quality 
- Construct 
validity 
- Forward citations strongest predictor of patent quality, 
claims and backward citations second, family size 
forth (all coefficients positive) 
Harhoff, Scherer et al. (1999) - N=57.782 observations 
on 778 DE patents 
- Patent value - Direct 
validity 
- Significant 
- Positive correlation 
Harhoff and Reitzig (2000) - N=13.389 EP patents - Opposition - Construct 
validity 
- Insignificant 
Backward 
Citations# 
Reitzig (2002a) - N=813 EP patents - Opposition - Construct 
validity 
- Patent references significant 
- Positive 
Narin, Noma et al. (1987) - N=17 Pharmaceutical 
companies 
- Sum over the means 
of six financial 
variables 
- Construct 
validity 
- Significant 
- Positive 
Trajtenberg (1990) - N>2.000 (sales of CT 
scanners to US 
hospitals) 
- Social value 
computed for the 
innovation 
- Construct 
validity 
- Significant 
- Non-linear (convex) 
Lanjouw and Schankerman (1999)§ - N= approx. 8000 US 
patents 
- Latent variable of 
patent quality 
- Construct 
validity 
- Forward citations strongest predictor of patent quality, 
claims and backward citations second, family size 
forth (all coefficients positive) 
Albert, Avery et al. (1991) - N=77 Patents - Patent value - Direct 
validity 
- Significant 
- Positive 
- Non-linear 
Forward 
Citations 
Harhoff, Scherer et al. (1999) - N=57.782 DE patents - Patent value - Direct 
validity 
- Significant 
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Harhoff and Reitzig (2000) 
 
- N=13.389 EPO patents - Opposition - Construct 
validity 
- Significant 
- Non-linear (convex) 
 
Hall, Jaffe, Trajtenberg (2000) - 17,111 US 
Manufacturing Patents 
- Tobin’s Q - Construct 
validity 
- Significant 
- Positive correlation 
Lanjouw, Pakes et al. (1996) - N>20,000 DE patent 
renewals 
- Renewal decision - Construct 
validity 
- Significant 
Lanjouw and Schankerman (1999)§ - N= approx. 8000 US 
patents 
- Latent variable of 
patent quality 
- Construct 
validity 
- Forward citations strongest predictor of patent quality, 
claims and backward citations second, family size 
forth (all coefficients positive) 
Guellec and van Pottelsberghe de la 
Potterie (2000) 
- N=23.487 EP patent 
applications 
- Patent grant - Construct 
validity 
- Significant 
- Positive for G3 patenting 
Harhoff and Reitzig (2000) - N=13.389 EP patents - Opposition - Construct 
validity 
- Significant 
- Positive correlation 
Family Size 
Reitzig (2002a) - N=813 EP patents - Opposition - Construct 
validity 
- Significant 
- Positive 
Lerner (1994) - 535 Venture financed 
bio-technology firms 
- Value of the firm - Construct 
validity 
- Significant 
- Linear / positive correlation 
Harhoff, Scherer et al. (1999) 
 
- N=57.782 DE  patents - Patent value - Direct 
validity 
- Insignificant 
 
Harhoff and Reitzig (2000) 
 
- N=13.389 EP patents - Opposition - Construct 
validity 
- Insignificant 
Lanjouw and Schankerman (2000) - N=10.378 US patents - Infringement and 
challenge suits 
- Construct 
validity 
- Significant for infringement suits 
- Negative correlation 
Scope 
Reitzig (2002a) - N=813 EP patents - Opposition - Construct 
validity 
- Insignificant 
Lanjouw and Schankerman (2000) - N=10.378 US patents - Infringement and 
challenge suits 
- Construct 
validity 
- Significant 
- Negative effect of individual ownership 
Harhoff and Reitzig (2000) 
 
- N=13.389 EP patents - Opposition - Construct 
validity 
- Significant 
- Negative effect of individual ownership 
Ownership 
Guellec and van Pottelsberghe de la 
Potterie (2000) 
- N=23.487 EP patent 
applications 
- Patent grant - Construct 
validity 
- Cross-boarder ownership significant 
- Positive 
Legal 
Argument 
Harhoff, Scherer et al. (1999) - N=57.782 observations 
on 778 DE patents 
- Patent value - Direct 
validity 
- Significant 
- Positive 
Guellec and van Pottelsberghe de la 
Potterie (2000) 
- N=23.487 EP patent 
applications 
- Patent grant - Construct 
validity 
- Significant 
- PCT II strongly positive 
 
Patenting 
Strategy  
Reitzig (2002a) - N=813 EP patents - Opposition - Construct 
validity 
- PCT II significant 
- Positive 
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Number of 
Applicants 
Guellec and van Pottelsberghe de la 
Potterie (2000) 
- N=23.487 EP patent 
applications 
- Patent grant - Construct 
validity 
- Significant 
- Negative 
Number of 
Cross-Boarder 
Research Co-
operations 
Guellec and van Pottelsberghe de la 
Potterie (2000) 
- N=23.487  EP patent 
applications 
- Patent grant - Construct 
validity 
- Significant 
- Positive 
Accelerated 
Examination 
Request 
Reitzig (2002a) - N=813 EP patents - Opposition - Construct 
validity 
- Significant 
- Positive 
Tong and Frame (1992) - N=7.531 US patents - R&D 
- GNP 
- Construct 
validity 
- Significant 
- Claim counts outperform pat ent counts 
Lanjouw and Schankerman (1999)§ - N= approx. 8000 US 
patents 
- Latent Variable of 
Patent Quality 
- Construct 
validity 
- Forward citations strongest predictor of patent quality, 
claims and backward citations second, family size 
forth (all coefficients positive) 
Lanjouw and Schankerman (2000) - N=10.378 US patents - Infringement and 
challenge suits 
- Construct 
validity 
- Significant 
- Positive 
Claims 
Reitzig (2002a) - N=813 EP patents - Opposition - Construct 
validity 
- Dependent and independent product claims significant 
and positive 
- Application claims significant and negative 
 
Note: #: Note that several indicators compiled from backward citations are summarised in this table, e.g. science linkage, patent references or legal quality. 
This table contains a selection of studies and is not complete. 
§: In the first part of their paper, (Lanjouw and Schankerman 1999) estimate a latent variable construct for patent quality and assume that forward citations, backward citations, family size and claims contribute to 
patent value; the results are therefore somehow ‘self-referential’. The second part (verification of the results using renewal and litigation data) is not discussed here. 
 
 Appendix B: Derivation of the ML estimator 
 
Condition (1) for an opposition being filed is as follows: 
 
noopponentrvopponentamopponentrj opprevocationpoppamendmentpopprejectionp pppp >×+×+× .)|(.)|(.)|( (1) 
 
Using assumptions A1, A2 and A4 yields equation (3) 
 
)0()),,(( cfactorsotheractivityinventivenoveltyfcp +>--     (3) 
 
that denotes the simplified condition for an opposition being filed. 
If H1, H2, and H3 are true, then condition (3) must take the following form: 
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( )( ) ( )( )hegb +->-+-Û åå pczxp 11    (5). 
 
In the following, the observable term( )( ) czxp -+- åå gb1  is referred to as a , and the 
unobservable term ( )( )he +- p1  is referred to asx . 
Modeling (5) as a probit must yield a likelihood function with three distinct probabilities, 
p(W=0), p(W=1,V=0), and p(W=1,V=1), where  
 
W=1 denotes the occurrence of an opposition (W=0 otherwise), and  
V=0 denotes the revocation of the patent (V=1 otherwise). 
 
According to (5) the likelihood of no opposition taking place is given by 
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In the case of an opposition there are two possible outcomes depending on the (opponent’s 
anticipation of the) EPO’s decision. Using assumption A3 yields the following additional 
 X
condition for the opponent’s anticipated probability of the patent being upheld after the 
opposition (2nd stage): 
 
å += ebxp       (7). 
 
Modeling (7) as a simple probit model (assuming 1=es ) yields the following equation for p: 
 
åF= )( bxp      (8). 
 
Thus, the likelihood of an opposition taking place and the patent being upheld (or amended) is 
described by the binormal distribution 
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where exr , is the correlation coefficient between the disturbances of the 1
st stage (opposition 
yes/no) and 2nd stage (patent revoked/upheld or amended) that can be calculated to  
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assuming that 1=hs . Analogously to (9), the probability of the patent being revoked can be 
calculated as 
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Equations (6), (9), and (11) finally constitute the ML estimator function (4): 
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Figure 1 
Decision Tree of the Opponent 
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Figure 2 
Share of Undecided Oppositions Among All Opposition Cases in Polymers  
vs. Year of Patent Grant  
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
Variable 
 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Opposition (1: yes, 0: no)1) 11.45  0 1 
Rejection of Opposition (1: yes, 0: no) 2) 25.95  0 1 
Amendment after Opposition (1: yes, 0: no) 2) 20.93  0 1 
Revocation of Patent after Opposition (1: yes, 0: 
no) 2) 
38.07  0 1 
Opposition Procedure Closed (1: yes, 0: no) 2) 4.80  0 1 
Opposition Outcome not Definable (1: yes, 0: no) 
2) 
10.33  0 1 
Number of Backward Citations to the Patent 
Literature1) 
3.11 1.93 0 24 
Number of Backward Citations to the Non-Patent 
Literature1) 
0.51 0.92 0 13 
Number of Designated States (Family Size) 1) 7.47 3.21 1 15 
Number of Applicants1) 1.04 0.22 1 5 
Number of Inventors1) 2.73 1.48 1 18 
Number of Forward Citations (3 years frame) 1) 0.55 1.06 0 18 
Accelerated Examination Request (1: yes, 0: no) 1) 0.77  0 1 
PCT I (1: yes, 0: no) 1) 0.06  0 1 
PCT II (1: yes, 0: no) 1) 7.11  0 1 
 
Legend:  1):  Entire sample comprising N=16,711 patents. 
     2):  Sample of opposed patents comprising N=1,915 patents. 
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Table 2 
Probit Estimations in the Reduced Form 
A. Likelihood of an Opposition 
B. Likelihood of Patent Maintenance following Opposition 
 
Variable3) 
 
Column A 
(S.D.)1) 
Column B 
(S.D.) 2) 
Number of Backward Citations to the Patent 
Literature 
0.29*** 
(0.07) 
0.17  
(0.15) 
Number of Backward Citations to the Non-Patent 
Literature 
-0.93*** 
(0.16) 
0.06  
(0.37) 
Number of Designated States (Family Size) 0.15*** 
(0.04) 
0.16  
(0.09) 
Number of Applicants 0.13  
(0.57) 
-0.76  
(1.31) 
Number of Inventors -0.01  
(0.09) 
0.39** 
(0.21) 
Number of Forward Citations (3 years frame) 0.42*** 
(0.11) 
0.24  
(0.26) 
Accelerated Examination Request (1: yes, 0: no) 1.46  
(1.36) 
3.03  
(3.13) 
PCT I (1: yes, 0: no) 2.71*  
(1.60) 
1.14  
(3.48) 
PCT II (1: yes, 0: no) 0.62  
(0.57) 
0.11  
(1.31) 
Constant -14.07*** 
(0.75) 
0.77  
(1.71) 
Log Likelihood Ratio Test for s²: c2 (9) 85.06 10.47 
P-Value <0.001 3.14 
 
Legend:  1):  Entire sample comprising N=16,711 patents. 
     2):  Sample of opposed patents comprising N=1,915 patents. 
     3): All coefficients are multiplied by factor 10. 
*/**/*** Significant at 10%/5%/1% level (two -tailed tests) 
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Table 3 
Estimations in the Structural Form 
XB: Indicators of Technical Value Drivers 
ZG: Indicators of Non-technical Value Drivers 
 
 
Variable 
 
Column (S.D.) 
Number of Backward Citations to the Patent Literature 0.23*  
(0.12) 
Number of Backward Citations to the Non-Patent Literature -0.42  
(0.34) 
Number of Designated States (Family Size) 0.22**  
(0.09) 
Number of Applicants -0.75  
(1.15) 
Number of Inventors 0.29  
(0.19) 
Number of Forward Citations (3 years frame)  0.43*  
(0.25) 
Accelerated Examination Request (1: yes, 0: no) 3.71  
(2.93) 
PCT I (1: yes, 0: no) 1.67  
(3.00) 
PCT II (1: yes, 0: no) 0.47  
(1.20) 
XB1) 
Constant -8.23 
(<0.01) 
Number of Backward Citations to the Patent Literature 0.13  
(0.11) 
Number of Backward Citations to the Non-Patent Literature -0.63**  
(0.28) 
Number of Designated States (Family Size) -0.00  
(0.01) 
Number of Applicants 0.65  
(0.89) 
Number of Inventors -0.22  
(0.14) 
Number of Forward Citations (3 years frame) 0.14  
(0.19) 
Accelerated Examination Request (1: yes, 0: no) -0.56  
(1.71) 
PCT I (1: yes, 0: no) 1.52  
(2.31) 
ZG1) 
PCT II (1: yes, 0: no) 0.32  
(0.94) 
Rho -0,51***  
(0,16) 
Costs1) 4,64*** 
(1,72) 
Wald c2 (9) 22,04 
P-Value <0.01 
 
Legend:  Entire sample comprising N=16,711 patents. 
     1): Coefficient multiplied by factor 10. 
*/**/*** Significant at 10%/5%/1% level (two -tailed tests) 
